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Simple Summary: New tools, allowing scientists to make precise changes to mammal genomes, have
made possible future increased use of larger mammals in biomedical research, such as primates, pigs,
and dogs. This paper addresses ethical issues that are raised by using larger mammals instead of
smaller ones in this research. Because scientists who use animals in research follow strict guidelines,
we first examine what those guidelines suggest for using larger mammals. We then consider what
philosophers, who write about the ethics of animal use, consider as the important questions in
evaluating which (if any) animals are acceptable to use in research. We find that philosophical
perspectives have typically been interested in the question of when or if animal use is justified, while
biomedical research guidance has assumed that animal use is justified but defined specific limits to
that use. To address directly the ethical questions that arise in the practice of biomedical research
in selecting which animals to use, we consider an approach to ethics that is focused on character
and living well (or flourishing). This paper is valuable to society in drawing attention to the ethical
questions, rather than merely the scientific issues, that are important in selecting which animals to
use in biomedical research.
Abstract: Recent developments in genome editing tools, along with limits in the translational potential
of rodent models of human disease, have spurred renewed biomedical research interest in large
mammals like nonhuman primates, pigs, and dogs. Such scientific developments raise ethical
issues about the use of these animals in comparison with smaller mammals, such as mice and rats.
To examine these ethical questions, we first consider standard (or “orthodox”) approaches, including
ethics oversight within biomedical research communities, and critical theoretical reflections on animal
research, including rights-based and utilitarian approaches. We argue that oversight of biomedical
research offers guidance on the profession’s permitted uses of animals within a research setting
and orthodox approaches to animal ethics questions when and whether animals should be used in
biomedicine; however, neither approach sufficiently investigates the nuances of ethical practices
within the research setting. To fill this lacuna, we consider a virtue ethical approach to the use
of specific animal models in biomedicine. From this perspective, we argued that limitations on
flourishing for large mammals in a research setting, as well as potential human-animal bonds, are two
sources of likely ethical tensions in animal care and use in the context of larger mammals.
Keywords: model animals; genome editing; animal ethics; virtue ethics; primate research;
translational research
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1. Introduction
If scientists can substitute the use of 10 genome-edited monkeys for the use of 1000 genome-edited
mice in a search for a treatment for a devastating neurological disorder, should they do so? What if the
use of monkeys offers a more promising route to such a discovery? Questions about the tradeoffs in
using different types of animals as models for human disease raise important issues of relative animal
moral status, comparative welfare, and the virtues of science. Yet decisions about what animal models
to use in biomedicine are under-examined in the animal ethics literature, which tends to focus instead
on whether and when animal research is justified. At the same time, while animal researchers are
careful in selecting scientifically appropriate animal models, the ethical nuances of such tradeoffs are
also left relatively unexamined by the regulatory and professional norms that guide their work. In this
paper, we interrogate the ethical dimensions of potential tradeoffs between animal models of human
disease, focusing, in particular, on a likely trend toward greater use of genome-edited large mammals,
which could portend an eventual shift away from less successful rodent models of disease.
To examine ethical questions around such a tradeoff in the use of animals in research, we turn
first to the standard (or “orthodox”) approaches, which include, on one hand, ethics oversight within
biomedical research communities, and, on the other hand, critical theoretical reflections on animal
research, including rights-based and utilitarian approaches. While each of these perspectives has
something important to offer in considering whether and when to make tradeoffs between animal
models, we identify a lacuna left open by the standard dialectic involving the mentioned approaches.
Specifically, oversight of biomedical research offers guidance on the profession’s permitted uses of animals
within a research setting and orthodox approaches to animal ethics questions when and whether animals
should be used in biomedicine; however, neither approach investigates sufficiently the nuances of
ethical practices within the research setting. To fill this lacuna, we consider how a virtue ethical approach
to the use of specific animal models in biomedicine could add to the ethical dialogue. Before we
approach these issues, we need to say more about why a shift to increased uses of larger mammals
may be on the horizon for biomedicine.
2. Background: Scientific Rationale for a Move to Large Mammals
Since the advent of newer genome editing tools, such as editing via clustered regularly interspaced
short palindromic repeats (CRISPR), over 60 ethics and policy statements regarding the use of such
technologies in humans have appeared across the globe [1]. In contrast, far less attention has been
given to the ethical and policy implications of nonhuman animal uses of genome editing tools despite
their “immediate regulatory and scientific implications” [2]. As research animals have long been
subject to genetic manipulations, it is perhaps not surprising that the use of the newer genome editing
tools to create better animal models has raised little critique. Adding to the lack of public interest may
be the fact that, over the past century, rodents have increasingly been the model animals of choice
for genetic manipulation for translational research purposes [3]. However, the appeal of the newer
genome editing tools, along with limits in the translational potential of at least some rodent models of
human disease, has spurred renewed biomedical research interest in large mammals like nonhuman
primates (nhps), pigs, and dogs [4].
Human clinical benefit from animal research depends on the translation of the knowledge gained
in an animal model to human patients and populations. While research in mice has been the mainstay
of much biomedical research progress, it has also repeatedly failed to translate into clinically relevant
interventions for humans [5,6]. Reasons for this lack of translation include, but are not limited to,
the mouse’s relatively short life span, small size, diet, and genomic differences to humans, each of
which can lead to poor mimicking of human disease onset, development, and treatment response [7,8].
These differences, together with the low actual rate of translation of findings, help explain the
increased interest in the use of animals that more closely match human biological, behavioral, and/or
genomic features. While past efforts to manipulate large mammal genomes to create better models for
human disease were plagued by failures, including “low efficiency, silencing, poor regulation of gene
Animals 2020, 10, 77 3 of 16
expression, and variability associated with random integration” [9] (p. 1), the newer genome editing
tools, “allow those who want to understand disease processes or develop novel treatments to choose
the most appropriate animal species” [4] (p. 247). According to the United States (US) Department
of Agriculture statistics, for example, 2017 saw record numbers of nhps used in biomedical research
generally despite increasing public opposition to such uses [10].
Human neurodegenerative conditions, such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and Huntington’s, offer
a particularly stark example of the limitations of some rodent models of human disease and illustrate
why researchers may turn to nhps. Reasons for mouse models falling short in translation to clinical
results in these research areas include, in addition to the issues raised above, significant developmental
and functional differences between primate and rodent brains [11]. Given that human neurological
and psychiatric diseases may not be fully recapitulated even when rodents are genetically modified,
researchers argue “it is essential to explore genetic manipulation of non-human primates to investigate
brain structures and functions and to develop in vivo models for human neurological and psychiatric
diseases” [12] (p. 1). A recent request by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) for proposals to
expand marmoset colonies to promote neuroscience research is in keeping with the potential turn to
nhps in this field [13]. Significantly, marmosets’ small size among primates and complex behaviors as
compared with small non-primate mammals, make them a particularly appealing model animal for
brain studies.
In sum, the advent of the newer genome editing tools has changed the scientific landscape in
terms of the ability to genetically engineer nhp and other larger mammal models of human diseases as
they give the ability to more effectively target loci in the genome and to specifically delete, and also to
insert, customized DNA. While a dramatic shift in the technical ability to engineer large mammals may
be tempered in reality by the costs and caretaking challenges generally associated with the use of these
animals in biomedicine, it is not implausible to suggest that their use may increase rapidly in the near
future. Further, such a shift may go hand in hand with a lower preference for using rodent models of
human diseases, which are currently used in the millions around the world [14]. Because, in practice,
fewer large mammals are used for individual protocols than are rodents (particularly mice), shifting
away from the use of mice could mean using significantly fewer animals in research overall. Such a
large-scale tradeoff should be examined ethically whether or not its reality comes to fruition. For ease
of reference, we refer to this scenario as “the tradeoff” for the remainder of this paper.
3. The Animal Researcher’s Orthodoxy: Responsible Conduct of Research
Animal researchers look to professional guidance on the responsible conduct of research (RCR)
when considering shifts in their practices. The RCR perspective (specifically, regulatory guidance and
animal research practice norms) on the use of animals in biomedicine has largely been concerned with
compliance with the 3Rs (reduction, refinement, replacement) along with an overarching principle
of promoting animal welfare so far as this is compatible with science goals. This perspective creates
certain boundaries around permissible uses of different animals in biomedicine; however, as we explain
in this section, insufficient guidance regarding ethical issues in animal model choice that might arise in
the tradeoff. We take into account US and European Union (EU) regulatory guidance as among the
most developed systems of oversight available in the animal research world. That this is perceived to
be the case can be seen from the heavy reliance of international accreditation services on the guidance
put forth by these bodies [15].
The widely accepted 3Rs framework for animal research was initially proposed in the middle
of the 20th century [16]. Since that time, it has been explicitly embraced in both the US and the EU
regulatory structures [17,18]. This framework encourages the use of the least number of animals
needed for the goals of the science (reduction), minimization of animal pain and distress where
possible (refinement), and avoiding the use of animals where adequate non-animal alternatives exist
(replacement). In addition, relative (or partial) replacement aims to substitute the use of sentient
animals with animals considered to lack a similar capacity for pain and distress. What is meant,
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however, by “relative replacement” is a matter of some contention [19]. As originally defined, relative
replacement refers to the use of animals exposed “probably or certainly, to no distress at all” [16] (p.
70). In contemporary usage, however, relative replacement has been defined in a diversity of ways,
including by the widely used Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals as “replacing animals such
as vertebrates with animals that are lower on the phylogenetic scale” [17] (p. 5). As has been pointed
out by other commentators, it is unclear whether this definition refers only to replacing vertebrate
with invertebrate animals (some of which are also highly sentient) or could also refer to replacing
any animal higher on the phylogenetic scale with an animal lower on that scale, such as specifically
the replacement of monkeys with mice [19] (p. 127). Indeed, understood in this way, something like
a sliding scale of ethical consideration of animal interests may appear to overlay this phylogenetic
scale [20] (pp. 35–37).
The tradeoff appears in line with reduction in so far as it offers the potential to use fewer animals
in research. Such an inference accords at least with typical science practices in which fewer large
animals are used per protocol than is the case with smaller animals, such as mice, although it is an open
question whether statistically speaking such differences in numbers used are justified. It is important
to note that, if such differences in numbers typically used are not justified, this is an ethical issue in
its own right. Within the RCR approach, it is considered ethically problematic to “waste” animals
either by using too few animals to achieve the scientific objectives of a study or by using more animals
than those needed [21]. At the same time, using at least some larger mammals may conflict with the
idea of relative replacement if we believe that there is a significant difference in sentience between,
for example, a mouse and a monkey or generally if we interpret relative replacement expansively to
encompass the broader phylogenetic scale. Since the 3Rs are not priority ranked, it isn’t clear what
guidance they provide when in tension. Moreover, there are questions about how to interpret the Rs
that are relevant to the scenario we suggest. For example, reduction may be understood as a norm
to be applied to each research protocol in the name of efficiency or more comprehensively to the
use of animals in biomedicine [22]. Also, as we have just discussed, relative replacement may refer
to a phylogenetic scale or to the practice of using animals in ways that involve no pain or distress.
Due to the internal conflict that is possible within the 3Rs framework, as well as differences in how
the concepts are interpreted, we suggest that without further interpretation and elaboration, the 3Rs
would have difficulty addressing the ethical nuances of complex decisions regarding animal model
choice relevant in the tradeoff.
Beyond the 3Rs, animal research projects approved in the EU are required to meet two standards
that are somewhat different than what is currently in effect in the US. In particular, they must be
evaluated by a harm-benefit analysis and must not exceed an upper limit to pain and distress for
the animal subjects. The harm-benefit analysis is, “to assess whether the harm to the animals in
terms of suffering, pain and distress is justified by the expected outcome taking into account ethical
considerations, and may ultimately benefit human beings, animals or the environment“ [18] (article
38d). While the US regulatory structure has a similar admonition that, “Procedures involving animals
should be designed and performed with due consideration of their relevance to human or animal
health, the advancement of knowledge, or the good of society” [23], there is no specific requirement
for a harm-benefit analysis by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) tasked
with protocol approval by both the federal law (the Animal Welfare Act (AWA)) [24] and the policy
covering most government-funded research (the Public Health Service Policy) [25]. Regardless, it is
overall reasonable to conclude that a required harm-benefit analysis (or “due consideration” of benefit)
may not offer significant ethical guidance for the tradeoff. Harm-benefit analyses are completed as
assessments of individual projects and, in that way, serve as a gateway to permissible research on
a case-by-case basis. Returning to our opening example of using 10 nhps instead of 1000 mice will
perhaps drive the point home. As long as both the rodent and the nhp project are found to be on balance
beneficial, both are permitted. While IACUCs or Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) can alternatively
propose that a particular animal is not scientifically appropriate for use in a particular type of experiment,
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this is not the dynamic at issue in the tradeoff we are considering. Thus, harm-benefit analyses do not
typically yield an either/or but a both/and response. This point notwithstanding, the general methods
of harm-benefit analyses, either in terms of a stakeholder dialogue or predefined metrics [26], could
also be utilized comparatively to assess relative harms and potential for translational value for specific
model animals in light of particular scientific goals. For such comparative use of harm-benefit analyses
to be relevant to protocol approval, researchers would then need to propose options of various animal
models to pursue a particular scientific aim.
What constitutes an upper pain and distress limit is never made explicit in the EU Directive
2010/63. However, this issue is addressed implicitly in an annex to the Directive, which notes the
permissibility of a host of interventions that are deemed to produce severe, but allowable, pain and/or
distress. Examples include breeding animals with extremely dysfunctional phenotypes, inescapable
electric shock, exercise to exhaustion, prolonged isolation of social species, and trauma to produce
organ failure [18] (annex viii). Such a regulatory upper limit on pain and distress thus also seems
to offer no helpful guidance on the issue we addressed here. The genomic modifications of larger
mammals to produce models of human disease are not likely to include harm beyond these severe but
allowable levels. Further, if they do so, these harms are likely to be similarly devastating for both small
and large mammal species.
As a general matter, nonhuman primates and dogs are given some special mention and protection
in both the US and EU oversight structures as compared to rodents, pigs, and some other species
used in biomedical research. In the US, special protections include requirements within the AWA
for the psychological welfare of primates and the exercise of dogs [24] (Section 2143;a;2;B). In the EU
Directive 2010/63, the use of nhps is limited specifically to “those biomedical areas essential for the
benefit of human beings, for which no other alternative replacement methods are yet available” [18]
(preamble 17). However, a sufficient scientific rationale is perceived as justifying the use of both
primates and traditional companion animal species in both US and EU biomedical research contexts.
Thus, while specific obligations in the care of such animals in a research context differ from other
species, and the bar might be perceived to be somewhat higher in justifying their use according to
some interpretations of relative replacement and/or the sliding scale approach to weighting animal
interests, such utilization is nevertheless imminently approvable.
In some ways, it is not surprising that an RCR approach offers little guidance on ethical issues arising
in the choice of animal model, such as in the tradeoff. According to science’s own traditional values,
animal model choice can be characterized as driven by the goals of the science and the opportunities
offered by a host of practical considerations [27]. In such a context, the aim of professional ethics is to
define the boundaries of permissible animal use, not to probe the ethical advantages and disadvantages
of the choice of a particular animal subject. Regarding the science trend at issue, we have noted that
the turn to greater usage of large animal models is motivated by potential advantages in animal to
human translation, especially in some disease areas. At the same time, the animals at issue, especially
primates, are very expensive to procure and to maintain, are more difficult to breed, and, because of
their longer life spans, may take longer to exhibit disease states desired in the model. For these reasons
a financial and rate of science efficiency point of view could argue against larger animals’ greater use.
Thus, the extent to which the tradeoff takes off in biomedical research is likely to be conditioned by a
balancing of these pragmatic and scientific factors—particularly in the vacuum regarding the ethics of
species choice left open by the RCR framework.
4. The Animal Ethicist’s Orthodoxy: Rights and Utility
While animal researchers are guided by an RCR approach to their science, critical philosophical
voices in animal ethics turn to another set of orthodoxies—those provided by rights-based and utilitarian
moral theory. In this next section, we detail how these perspectives interrogate the presumptions of the
RCR framework and where they might engage the ethics of the tradeoff. As we explain, these orthodox
approaches to animal ethics attend in particular to questions of when and whether animal research
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is justifiable. Hence, they bring to bear specifically questions about the justifiability of the use of
animals in biomedical research in evaluating the tradeoff. Thus, while RCR approaches to the tradeoff
details permissible uses of animals within biomedicine, and the animal ethics orthodoxy offers critical
purchase on these claims, this dialectic as a whole leaves relatively unexamined ethical questions about
the very research practices involving the different types of animals at issue in the tradeoff.
4.1. Animal Rights: The Moral Status Objection
The tradeoff assumes that it is ethically acceptable to use mammals from mice to nhps for harmful
research purposes. This assumption necessarily lies behind both the US and EU regulatory frameworks
guiding animal use. Directive 2010/63 poses that this assumption is compatible with the intrinsic value
of animals since it both outlines the conditions for lawful uses of animals in biomedical research and
also directly affirms that animals have “intrinsic value which must be respected” [18] (preamble 12).
The US animal research oversight system instead remains silent regarding the direct moral value of
nonhuman animals, referring in guidance documents to the obligations of humans involved in animal
research to “assume responsibility for their well-being” [17] (p. 1). Such responsibility is compatible
with the animals themselves lacking direct moral value, as promoting animal welfare is also conducive
to more rigorous research outcomes.
The assumptions of these regulatory frameworks notwithstanding, it may be the case that some
animals have moral standing such that they have rights that would seriously restrict, or eliminate,
the harm that may be done to them for research purposes. Restrictions could come, for example, through
the insistence that animal rights be abrogated only in certain cases of rights conflicts. Whether or
when harmful research uses of animals might constitute such cases of rights conflicts is beyond the
scope of this paper. Regardless, the rights-based approach to animal ethics is so prevalent that animal
protectionists may be simply conflated with promoters of animal rights by members of the general
public. Even Peter Singer, a philosophical utilitarian, uses the rhetoric of animal rights in elaborating
his points about protecting animal interests [28]. Nevertheless, as a philosophical approach to the
modern animal ethics movement, animal rights have had a particular intellectual trajectory beginning
with the articulation by Tom Regan [29]. Regan draws inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s theory about
the moral status of rationally autonomous persons but argues instead that animal subjects of a life
have moral status as ends in themselves. Having such a status means they should not be used as mere
means to human benefit, including in biomedical research [29] (pp. 363–398). Subsequent animal
rights theorists have offered different bases for animal rights, including the “political turn” in animal
ethics [30,31], as well as feminist theory perspectives [32], and elaborated alternative theories of what
rights are in the animals’ case (see e.g., [33]). Throughout these theoretical evolutions, the language of,
and appeal to, animal rights remains a dominant orthodoxy in the animal ethics literature.
One significant way that a rights-based view would contribute to an ethical analysis of the tradeoff
is if there is a moral status difference between at least some larger mammals (e.g., primates, dogs,
and pigs) and at least some smaller mammals (e.g., mice) that defies the regulatory standards guiding
their use. While we have already indicated how a certain understanding of relative replacement could
dovetail with a sliding scale consideration of animal interests, it is also possible that those animals
higher on the phylogenetic scale deserve more protections than what is offered in the current regulatory
structure based on substantive features of their interests. Such a conclusion could make the tradeoff
either morally impermissible or subject to certain restrictive standards. Carolyn Neuhaus, for example,
argues that, while some biomedical uses of animals are acceptable, the use of genome-edited nhps to
model human brain disorders is not [34]. Using David DeGrazia’s discussion of the common-sense
idea of degrees of moral status, she describes that mice have an interest in avoiding pain, while humans
have morally “weightier” interests in preserving their agency [34] (p. 2). She continues, “This view
permits degrees of moral status ordered by the weightiness of interests. It is consistent with this view
that we have some obligations to mice, for example, to avoid or at least reduce pain and suffering,
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but since human interests matter more, we are also justified in using mice, thereby thwarting their
interests, to advance human interests” [34] (p. 2).
Does such a view offer a reason to think that nhps have rights not to be included in some harmful
research that mice do not? Maybe. It is important to recognize that our obligations not to harm other
individual creatures are dependent, on this view, on whether harming them furthers the interests of
those with “higher” moral status (especially humans). But this kind of protection seems to fail another
common sense test—of what it means for someone to have rights. In particular, it would seem a right
not to be harmed should be independent of whether another set of individuals might benefit from such
harm (conflicts between rights aside). Thus, while it may be true that in this picture, mice have a kind
of weak moral status, they do not have rights. The question for such a view then will be whether nhps
are also “below” humans on the moral status ranking according to the “weightiness” of their interests.
If they are, it seems plausible to contend they also fail to have a right against being used in precisely
the kinds of brain disorder research in question. Of course not having such a right doesn’t settle the
issue of whether nhps ought to be so used, and Neuhaus’ argument against their use is significant
in drawing on issues of animal welfare, alternatives, and lack of benefit in the face of the unsettled
question about nhp moral status.
Nevertheless, it is precisely the connection between moral status and rights that we are interrogating
here, and from that point of view, it seems that graduated views of moral status are on shaky ground
as a basis for animal rights. As an alternative approach, the view that the moral status grounding
rights is either “on” or “off” allows for moral obligation to be a special kind of attention owed on
the basis of the needs and interests of individual creatures regardless of where that creature falls in
a hierarchy with other creatures. There are many ethically valuable features of animals that have
been addressed in the literature, including their capacity to experience pain and pleasure [35], being a
‘subject of a life’ [29], being a member of a shared society [36], or even having moral capacities [37].
The problematic implication of an on/off view of moral status, however, is that the world is divided
into those who are owed moral consideration and those that are not—categories traditionally labeled
“persons” and “things” where a person is a being (of any species or type) with rights, and a thing is an
item that may be used as a mere means. While such a view is theoretically neater than a graduated
view of moral status, practically speaking where to draw this ethical red line between creatures is
highly fraught. For any basis we might select in grounding our moral consideration of animals, it is
implausible that there is an in-kind difference that would support such a line being drawn between
the laboratory rat and pig or, perhaps, the mouse and the monkey. Thus, it would appear that on a
rights-based approach, it is plausible to suppose that if a monkey has a right not to be included in
harmful biomedical research, then so does a mouse.
A rights-based approach to the tradeoff is thus going to be interested in the question of whether all,
none, or only some of the animals being considered as models for human diseases have presumptive
rights against inclusion in harmful biomedical research. This perspective interrogates the assumption
of the RCR approach that any scientifically justified and socially valuable animal research is thereby
permissible. The impasse in the dialectic will be if the RCR approach dictates that all such research
is permitted and the rights-based approach determines none (or almost none) is ethically defensible.
In such a scenario (which is not an unlikely outcome), neither approach will offer advice on ethical
questions regarding actual choices between animal models taking place in research practices.
4.2. Animal Welfare: The Utilitarian Objection
The 3Rs offer a pragmatic framework that assumes the moral validity of animal research, and also
aims to move us toward a world with less harmful, and more circumscribed, research uses of animals.
However, it is important to consider what ethical principle(s) may undergird this framework. The idea
of reduction, for example, assumes that it is ethically significant to use fewer, rather than more, animals
to achieve a particular scientific goal. Now from a wholly practical standpoint, using more animals
than needed is a waste of “resources”, including time, money, and the animals themselves. For the
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aim of reduction to offer an ethical goal, further reasoning is needed. The most plausible ethical
argument supporting a reduction in animal use is a utilitarian objective of minimizing suffering.
Similarly, for relative replacement, the assumption that it is ethically preferable to use less sentient (or
non-sentient) animals most clearly relates to a utilitarian goal of an overall reduction of suffering.
If both concepts rely on a utilitarian ethical rationale, how do reduction and relative replacement
withstand a utilitarian assessment and, in particular, can appeal to this moral theory offer guidance on
the tradeoff that the 3Rs could not? Utilitarianism constitutes the second prong of the animal ethics
orthodoxy. Although utilitarianism had been applied to animal welfare by its earliest proponent,
Jeremy Bentham [38] (p. 311), the philosopher Peter Singer articulated the utilitarian perspective
most associated with the modern animal protection movement. His early work argues that morality
requires giving equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings as he rejects what he terms
our “speciesist” attitudes toward nonhuman animals [28] such as can also be found in a sliding
scale consideration of their interests. Subsequent animal ethicists have embraced utilitarianism as an
approach to animal protection (see e.g., [39,40]), and even as a way of gauging the most effective means
of activism in favor of animal welfare through a movement called “effective altruism” [41].
Utilitarian metrics suggest that we maximize overall benefit (greatest welfare for the greatest
number) and minimize overall harm (least harm for the fewest individuals) for all those affected by
our actions (or policies). From the point of view of lowering the amount of suffering a study “costs,”
the numbers of animals used is a helpful metric only if we assume that pain and distress are held
steady. The ethical justification for relative replacement, however, must be that capacities for pain
and/or distress are not held constant between certain species of animals. The justification for selecting
mice over primates as a preferred model would thus rest on the assumption that primates, when
subjected to similar experimental interventions, will suffer more. This could be the case for a number of
different reasons, including a psychological capacity for more intensive suffering, a higher cognizance
of pain or distress as persisting over time, or a greater concern for the suffering of conspecifics. At the
same time, it may be argued that we are on thin ice when it comes to making comparative sentience
claims across vertebrate species. It is unclear, for example, whether more complex intellectual or
psychological capacities are associated with greater or lesser pain or distress, given similarly harmful
interventions. For example, capacities that seem to promote a beings’ sensitivity to suffering may also
help to ameliorate that suffering by providing sources of adaptation and resilience [42,43]. In keeping
with this point, Russell and Burch’s original concept of relative replacement, as also cited above,
specified that such replacement involves animals not subject to pain or distress in the actual experiment
because of being used in a terminal sedation experiment, being humanely killed and used as cells, or as
invertebrate or decerebrate animals incapable of experiencing pain [44]. Thus the use of a sliding scale
of consideration of animal interests that overlays a phylogenetic scale, but does not reflect sentience
differences, appears prejudicial from a utilitarian perspective.
Given these considerations, how would a utilitarian analysis guide us in the tradeoff? On the
harm (disutility) side, a utilitarian will prefer studies with lower numbers of animals used unless an
increase in harm to the animals in question leads to greater overall harm. As already noted, this issue
of relative harm, in particular between species with different capabilities, is complex and difficult to
resolve. On the benefit (utility) side, it will matter a great deal how effectively the studies at issue can
impact human health outcomes. For this reason, the greater translation promised for research using
larger mammals is a critical point for the utilitarian analysis. Accordingly, it may seem that a utilitarian
will argue that the tradeoff is justified.
What this analysis fails to address, however, is unlike a 3Rs proponent, a utilitarian will not
presuppose the ethical justification of the animal research enterprise. Peter Singer, for example,
claims that very little biomedical research is justifiable under a principle of equal consideration of
interests [35] (p. 92). The EU Directive 2010/63, by contrast, requires that research uses of animals
offer a positive harm-benefit profile (a utilitarian idea), yet the implication is that such analyses are
compatible with a vast biomedical research industry. While both the philosophical and RCR approach
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may rely on fundamentally utilitarian reasoning, then, they start from different basic assumptions
about the overarching welfare benefits of animal research as well as, potentially, about the relative
ethical significance of harms and benefits to humans and to other species.
Thus, the implications of a broader utilitarian ethic for the tradeoff depends both on how sanguine
we are about the benefits of animal research, and how egalitarian we are about considering harms
to species other than humans. It could turn out, for example, that while much mouse research aimed
at neurodegenerative disease amelioration was never justifiable on a species neutral harm-benefit
balancing, some primate research aimed at a similar goal is justified—if it truly has transformative
effects on human health and only a small number of nhps are used. Importantly, on a species neutral
balancing of benefits and harms, it could also turn out that if a small number of humans can be used to
offer interventions that will vastly improve the quality of life of nhps, then that too would be justifiable.
5. Character and Animal Flourishing
So far, we have offered a sketch of how animal rights and utilitarian approaches to the tradeoff
engage with the RCR approach by interrogating presumptions about whether and when animal
research is itself justified. Yet while the resulting dialectic is illuminating regarding some of the
justificatory issues raised by the tradeoff, it fails to sufficiently address ethical issues of animal model
choice arising within animal research practices. A virtue-based approach helps to fill out the ethical
analysis by bringing to bear character implications for each type of research, as well as a focus on the
flourishing of the animals in question [45,46].
Flourishing does not simply involve avoiding pain and suffering and/or experiencing pleasure or
interest satisfaction but is associated with kind-specific norms for different animals [46]. Within an
Aristotelian tradition, humans are capable of Eudaimonia—a particular type of flourishing constituted
by virtuous activity but also supported by other goods, such as friendship, family, sufficient wealth,
and good health, throughout an entire lifetime. In Aristotle’s metaphysical framework, Eudaimonia is
our natural end, or telos, as humans. Bernard Rollin has utilized the idea of telos as a common-sense
biological concept to underwrite an ethical perspective on treating animals in ways that promote their
individual natures [47]. Still, a teleological view of nature is highly contentious as a metaphysics, and it
is possible to consider flourishing for both human and nonhuman animals without relying on this
particular concept. Specifically, while nonhuman animals don’t flourish in the same way as humans do
because they are not (at least as traditionally viewed) capable of virtue, there will be something that it
means for each type of animal to live a good life. Martha Nussbaum has developed a capabilities theory
according to which attending to animal flourishing is a requirement of justice [48]. Rebecca Walker has
argued that there is room within a broadly Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics to ground human
obligations to directly promote animal flourishing [46]. Regardless of what approach is taken, however,
it will be the case that specific human virtues, such as care and compassion, require attention to animal
flourishing in the contexts in which researchers and others engage with animal subjects.
Independently of the question of research-associated harms, it is much more difficult to offer a
good life for some types of animals than for others in a research setting [22]. Arguably primates and
dogs, for example, are extremely hard to accommodate in research settings in ways that allow them to
flourish. While we can see an acknowledgment of the limitations of the research environment for these
creatures in the AWA requirement that consideration is given to primate psychological welfare and that
dogs be allowed to exercise, much more than exercise for dogs and attention to psychological factors
for primates is at stake. For dogs, living a good life will require extensive companionship, whether
with conspecifics or others (such as humans), habituation and training, time spent outdoors in enjoying
open spaces and smells, avoidance of boredom, and play [49]. For nonhuman primates, engaging in
appropriate social structures, foraging for food, having access to outdoor territories, and intellectual
engagement are all factors in flourishing [50,51].
While some types of research facilities—such as primate centers—will presumably do better than
others at making flourishing possible for these creatures, promoting animal good lives, through means
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such as appropriate social housing, can be extremely challenging within biomedical research [50].
Depending on the facility, animals may be confined indoors and maybe singly housed due to social
‘incompatibility’, cross-exposure, or other concerns [52]. Stereotypic behaviors, which do not occur in
the wild, have been attributed to the most frequently used nhp species in biomedical research due to
various welfare undermining features of captivity [53]. There are also significant de facto impediments
to mouse flourishing in a typical biomedical facility [52], so we make no claim that mice flourish in
such settings while larger animals do not, only that it may be more difficult to make possible a good
life for larger mammals given their size, social, and intellectual needs, and the resources and space
required to do so.
A utilitarian or rights-based perspective on animal research will view the acceptability of a
research project as a function of its comportment to specific moral principles; however, a virtue
ethical assessment depends on compatibility with the exercise of the relevant virtues and avoidance of
vice. Thus, research that is inherently cruel or that is incompatible with the compassionate treatment
of animal subjects is thereby unethical. Research projects or practices in which the practically wise
researcher would engage, however, are to be promoted in the manner of the virtuous person. That is,
in ways that track appropriate consideration, perception, emotion, and motivation [54].
Because the individual virtues, as stable character traits, are responsive to each specific context,
they carry with them ready-to-hand obligations to attend to the needs and interests of nonhuman
animals at the point of engagement. To give a few examples: compassion is oriented to the alleviation
of suffering, loyalty is manifested in allegiance to particular animals, and care is oriented to meeting
the needs of those who are in some sense dependent on us. Intellectual virtues, such as intellectual
humility, honesty, and integrity, will also be critical for good science practices, for example, accurately
perceiving and portraying both the likely human (or animal) benefits and actual animal harms involved
in any research project.
How do these considerations of virtue engage with an ethical assessment of the move to increased
use of larger animal models in lieu of larger numbers of smaller animals? A key question is whether
the practically wise animal researcher would engage in each type of research. That question, however,
is too vague to give us much traction. We have already noted concerns about large animals’ ability to
flourish in a biomedical research setting. To the extent that they are not able to flourish, then, care
and compassion may be incompatible with their use. This analysis may mean that some research is
compatible with virtue only within certain types of facilities. The importance of context-sensitivity for
any virtue ethical analysis must be reinforced at this juncture, as it is neither the case that all nhps,
for example, are large animals nor that the limitations on meeting their needs are similar for all species.
Olsson and Sandøe point to marmosets’ comparatively small size, ease of breeding in captivity, and the
potential for good housing in analyzing the ethical implications of establishing transgenic marmoset
colonies [55].
Also significant, is a consideration of human-animal bonds (HABs) in a research setting.
While relationships between nonhuman and human animals are not friendships in a robust Aristotelian
sense (which requires, among other features, shared virtue), they create bonds between particular
humans and particular other animals in which both parties are participants [56]. Because virtue ethics,
at least on an Aristotelian picture, makes room for ethical partiality [57], the virtue of care in the context
of HABs brings along special obligations to particular others.
HABs are typically more significant in species like primates, pigs, or dogs. This is not only because
of the smaller numbers of animals with whom researchers work, but also because of the greater ability
of these species to reciprocate human attention. Because these species are susceptible to HABs, such
relationships are also crucial to the success of the research enterprise. For example, developing habits
of compliance with research-related interventions (blood draws, etc.) lowers stress levels for the
animals [58]. Such bonds, moreover, may contribute to good habits on the part of the researchers
themselves who will remain attentive to animal needs, be better able to recognize the animals as
individuals with their own interests, and also gain benefit from the relationship. Taking these factors
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into account, animal suffering may actually decrease in the use of some nhps over mice if it becomes
“easier for scientists and caretakers to recognize signs of suffering and [by] increasing the human
motivation to limit it” [55] (p. 181).
Yet forming relationships with research animals may also create a significant ethical tension for the
use of larger animals when the research involves harming the animal subjects [59]. In short, although it
seems incumbent that researchers do form such bonds, when research uses are harmful, they also imply
a greater violation of a duty to care. While researchers have welfare obligations to the animals in their
studies regardless of HABs, the particular tension introduced by HABs is arguably a more significant
problem with respect to animals more able to bond with humans. Nevertheless, the use of large
mammals may also give researchers more of an opportunity to develop virtues, such as compassion
and care, as well as grapple with issues like justice, that are essential to good character. If this is indeed
the case, the ethical conundrum is in how to make such developed character traits fully compatible
with the uses to which such animals are put.
On a virtue ethical analysis, two lines of argument imply that research using some large mammals
can be more ethically fraught than similar research using some smaller mammals. These are the
limitations on flourishing for some larger animals in a research setting, and the HABs that are more
likely to result in irresolvable tensions in animal care and use in the context of larger mammals.
Neither argument establishes that it is impossible for the practically wise researcher to use larger
mammals in biomedical research, nor do they imply that the practically wise researcher necessarily is
justified in using smaller mammals. A virtue ethical approach to the tradeoff instead asks us to address
the specific context of the research in question in considering whether the project can be conducted
in the manner of the practically wise. Answering this question will require attending to more than
whether the research is on balance beneficial or whether the types of animals involved have rights
against being harmed. It will require looking at the actual capacity for individual animals to flourish in
a particular research setting, at the habits of thought and action that a research environment promotes,
and ultimately whether specific moral and intellectual virtues are compatible with the research program
in question. To be clear, there is no particular reason why a rights-based or utilitarian approach to
animal ethics is constrained against bringing considerations of human virtue and animal flourishing
to bear in a contextually responsive assessment of animal research. Nevertheless, the mainstay
of such approaches has been otherwise while the particular toolbox of virtue ethics readily offers
these considerations.
We have argued that while RCR delimits boundaries to permissible research and the orthodox
approaches to animal ethics question these boundaries on the basis of specific moral principles, virtue
ethics looks to individual research contexts and their implications for human and animal flourishing in
assessing the tradeoff. In some ways, then, a virtue ethical approach to the tradeoff asks us to move
from idealized moral principles regarding our treatment of animals to an investigation of real-world
implications of the research enterprise for human character and animal flourishing. Charles W. Mills has
claimed, “the best way of realizing the ideal is through the recognition of the importance of theorizing
the nonideal” [60] (p. 166). Yet, virtue ethical theories are far from non-ideal—especially perfectionist
versions. In the final section of this paper, we discuss the way in which ideal and non-ideal factors
contribute to the moral question of the tradeoff.
6. Discussion: Real vs. Ideal World Considerations
There are several significant ways in which an interrelation between ideal and real-world theorizing
arises for this paper. The first idealized presumption is the pretense that actual tradeoffs might take
place between studies using very large numbers of rodents and studies using small numbers of larger
mammals. This idealization draws attention to the fictionalized but ethically salient tradeoff. In the
real world, the tradeoff itself will be simply diffused throughout the broader animal research world.
We have used the fiction of the tradeoff to put a fine point on the kinds of ethical conundrums that
may be involved in the trend toward the use of larger mammals. Yet, it is unlikely that individual
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researchers (or oversight groups) will face this conundrum as such. Moreover, while it is indubitable
that large animals are used on average in much smaller numbers for individual protocols than are
mice and some other smaller mammals, it is unclear how, statistically speaking, a researcher would
justify a direct tradeoff of this sort. It is more likely that the move to use greater numbers of larger
animal models will be revealed by shifting funding priorities or global trends in research, as is already
occurring in China’s “miniature explosion of genetic engineering in monkeys” [61].
How does theorizing the non-ideal in this sense change the ethics? Significantly, we don’t actually
know whether increased use of primates, pigs, and dogs will, in fact, mean less use of mice and rats.
It is possible instead that the uses of all these animals will simply increase as translational hurdles
for biomedical science seem to lower. It is therefore important to address concerns about potential
increased suffering, moral status barriers, species neutral harm-benefit analyses, and virtue ethical
factors as relevant to each particular study regardless of any specific exchange that may (or may not)
take place with the use of other animals.
The second way in which ideal and non-ideal theorizing are relevant for our paper is in the ideal
of the virtuous or practically wise person. In Aristotle’s framework, a practically wise person is a
kind of perfect human whose exercise of any particular virtue is as part of a unified and integrated
character. That person can only be called “eudaimon” at the end of his (women were not viewed as
capable of full virtue) life and had to be raised in a well-ordered political system with the external
supports of family and health, and even have certain physical features [62]. Prejudicial features of this
view aside, the political circumstances alone required for such a person to develop may imply none of
us can hope to attain this ideal. Further, our modern sensibilities have shifted our beliefs away from
parts of Aristotle’s vision of the virtues. We now tend to believe both that one can have some virtues
without having others and that virtues are not so stable under shifting social circumstances [63].
What is important from a non-ideal theory perspective, then, is what an appeal to virtue might
get us in the way of striving toward that ideal—toward improved, if flawed, character. We have
argued that the use of larger mammals in research is fraught from a virtue ethical perspective due
to obligations arising out of HABs, as well as concern for animal flourishing. We have also drawn
attention to the ethical importance of habits engendered in the research setting—and the need to find
institutional ways to support the development of care, compassion, honesty, integrity, and intellectual
humility, among other traits. These ethical factors thus require attention, even if we cannot definitively
answer the question of whether individual researchers are themselves virtuous.
The third intersection of the ideal and non-ideal arises from a presumption of animal research
science itself. The ideal goal of animal research should be to phase out the harmful use of animals
altogether. Animal researchers themselves may promote this goal and yet see it as incrementally
realizable (if at all) in the real world only through the 3Rs [64]. An important question, then, is whether
a move to larger animal models is a move toward or away from the idea of phasing out harmful
animal use.
One could argue that the potentially more translational use of larger animal models is a step in
the right direction of realizing this goal. It is possible that both overall numbers of animals used will
drop, and that the use of larger animals will lead to cures or scientific understandings of particular
human diseases and conditions that will allow animals to no longer be used in these areas of research
at all. Yet, as noted above, it is also plausible that animal use numbers may increase overall as greater
use of larger animals is simply added to the already prevalent uses of rodents. Further, if translational
science is truly improved by the use of larger animals, this may appear as an argument for ramping up
such uses, rather than phasing them out.
Finally, because research on dogs and primates, in particular, may capture social imaginations in
ways that research uses of mice and rats do not, there is an open question of how societies will respond
to increased use of larger mammals. Such responses are also likely to be culturally and temporally
dependent—a reflection of a societies’ character in a broader sense. For example, in China, there is
reportedly a growing interest in protecting dogs (which were previously not objects of compassion)
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but less interest than in the US in avoiding harmful uses of nhps [61]. It is possible that the trend
to greater uses of larger mammals will lead to increased social pressure to stop some such animal
research practices [10]. Alternatively, members of the general public could become desensitized to
the harmful use of typical objects of compassion, allowing for a slide into possibly cruel uses of such
animals. In either case, the argument that such research is “necessary” because of the greater promise
for human health could motivate acceptance of an increase in the use of genome-edited large mammals
even if these uses are otherwise seen as ethically problematic. To tackle this issue, we need to address
our collective character and what we value as a society.
7. Conclusions
A turn toward greater use of genome-edited large mammals in biomedical research may hold the
promise of better translation to human patients and populations. At this juncture, claims along these
lines are largely based on the presumption that similarities between larger mammals and humans will
play out in greater applicability of animal data to human health. While the RCR framework for animal
research offers significant oversight of research endeavors and promotes animal welfare and reduction,
refinement, and replacement, this perspective also takes for granted the ethical permissibility of harmful
research uses of animals and provides insufficient critical purchase on the potential ethical distinctions
between uses of different species of mammals. Rights-based and utilitarian approaches to animal ethics
bring wider moral theory to bear in questioning the ethical presumptions of the RCR framework and
engage the tradeoff as a justificatory question about when and whether certain animals may be used in
harmful research endeavors. The dialectic between the RCR and orthodox animal ethics views offers a
perspective relevant to the tradeoff but leaves a space open for addressing additional ethical complexities
in animal model choice arising within the practices of animal research. We have suggested that space
may be filled by: consideration of animal flourishing (beyond mere welfare) in the particular research
setting, HABs and the obligations of care, and research and institutional practices that allow for the
development of virtuous habits of thought and action. While virtue ethics looks to the practically wise
for moral guidance, we have suggested that we may need to be content with looking to the wise-enough.
Our thought experiment in the tradeoff is meant as a catalyst for comparative ethical analysis.
Yet, more realistically, the trend toward greater use of dogs, pigs, nhps, and other large mammals is
unlikely to yield specific exchanges of the type we describe. The conundrum, then, is whether this trend
will indeed lead to fewer uses of animals overall due to improved efficacy of the science, or whether
uses of larger mammals will increase while uses of rodents continue apace. Further complicating
matters is whether increased usage of larger mammals will help to sensitize scientists and the public to
the ethical difficulties and complexities of such research, or whether these uses might instead allow for
a greater distancing from the plight of these traditional objects of compassion. While it is too soon
to determine whether the turn to greater use of genome-edited large mammals is ethical folly, it is
certainly time to take up the question.
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